So, Who is Taking Care of Business? The Compliance Officer in Times of Economic Distress

It is not a startling revelation to observe that a principal side-effect of the current tribulations affecting the financial services industry is a marked shrinkage in revenues. Inevitably, there is a domino effect to the diminution in revenues and profits, and the financial services community, which potentially encompasses a wide array of businesses, including securities brokerage, investment advisory services, insurance, and banking, are under pressure to dramatically cut costs and reduce expenses, which often is interpreted to mean reduce headcount. This article will focus on one of the dangers faced by the brokerage/advisory industry if the reduction of costs includes the downsizing of compliance departments.

In the past, management often used numbers creatively, and reductions in staff levels at many entities historically have come in the form of the elimination of open but unfilled spots on the roster. By not filling the open spot, it may be argued that the group or department is down in head count, hereby meeting the corporate mandate to reduce or eliminate costs. Today, the cuts are deeper and closer to the bone, and they are across the organization. No segment of the business is immune or inured, including compliance staff. 

To appreciate its value to the entity, one must first define the role played by the compliance department. When it is functioning at its best, compliance is a pro-active body, anticipating areas of potential concern when a new product or business line is introduced, or formulating measures that are both practical and effective when regulatory rules change. The compliance arm is often vested with responsibility for identifying issues before they become problems or fester too long, working toward practical and therapeutic solutions and not just treating the side effects. This ability often comes from an innate knowledge of the firm, how it does business, and the standards posed by the regulatory agencies and the world at large on the conduct of firms operating in a highly regulated environment. The seasoned compliance officer develops a sixth sense for problems, recognizing the unusual from the pedestrian, creating his/her own “watch list” of potential sources of problems (e.g. know your broker), and generally being the eyes and ears, and maybe even the conscience, of the organization. 

Unlike the role often assumed by a firm’s legal department, which is frequently reactive and saddled with addressing actual or perceived sales practice violations or probing and demanding regulatory inquiries, compliance is vested with the responsibility to “prevent, avoid, and detect,” and to address in timely fashion procedural weaknesses or ethical shortcomings.

Wall Street today is a broken and battered remnant of a once proud pillar of U.S. economic strength.  While it’s convenient to blame greedy bankers and brokers for this unfortunate turn of events, its difficult to argue that compliance performed exceptionally well or with remarkable effectiveness in the recent past either. History has taught that even when fully staffed, the compliance task is difficult and success often ephemeral. Unfortunately, the short term cost benefits associated with a reduction of compliance personnel may prove illusory, increasing the likelihood that the company will pay later, perhaps at a significantly higher price, for problems that may have been avoided or detected earlier. Unless the organization is prepared to treat these later, magnified problems as simply a deferred cost of doing business, termination decisions should not be made capriciously or without careful and deliberate consideration of the repercussions and ramifications.

This is not to propose that compliance personnel not share in the vicissitudes of the organization, especially if they hope and expect to share in the firm’s fortunes. However, deep and non-surgical efforts to trim compliance staff may not bode well for the future of the firm, and should be exercised prudently and shrewdly. While computerized systems are invaluable tools and allow for extraordinarily creative techniques to aid in the management of the business, they may not universally fulfill the role of a seasoned compliance officer who is armed with the ability to see behind the superficial or the “logical.” Computer systems are beneficial as a tool, but they cannot provide a substitute for experience, perspective, or those intuitive vital skills developed by the compliance officer over years of trial, error, and observation.  

If the ax must fall, a significant component of the firm’s planning must address how the compliance function is to be carried out with minimal disruption to the oversight capabilities of its compliance staff.  Perhaps a new model must be developed for effective compliance. Perhaps technology can fill some of the gaps. Perhaps it is incumbent on management of the compliance function to cross-train the staff so that the disruptions caused by reduced headcount are minimalized. Perhaps people with fresh ideas must be identified, deputized, and given the opportunity introduce untraditional and innovative approaches. But the answer is probably not to impose on another existing and functional arm of the firm duties beyond the capabilities or experience of its personnel. The effort to impose compliance responsibility on personnel with lesser pure compliance expertise, such as staff assigned to the financial or operations sides of the business, may be superficially appealing since they are all “back-office,” non-revenue producing divisions, and work in the arcane world of rules and regulations.  But such an approach may be a recipe for failure, as over-burdened, under-trained staff in accord with the Peter Principle and similar truisms prove incapable of ultimately performing either job to appropriate standards. 

Even if regulatory mandate did not impose on firms the obligation to establish and maintain an effective compliance presence, sound business practices would dictate it. The mantra “good compliance is good for business” still rings true today, and those firms which will not only survive the present economic malaise but will flourish when times are better will be those that strike the appropriate balance between business objectives and oversight necessity.

Wearing the Bull's-eye: The Compliance Officer as Line Supervisor

It is axiomatic that smaller firms do not have available the cadres of specialized compliance personnel that larger firms do. Out of necessity, senior compliance staff at smaller firms may be called upon to handle a multitude of home office functions in addition to compliance, and to serve in multiple capacities. Unfortunately, cost efficiency, not necessarily expertise is the driver of these decisions. This burden may fall especially hard on compliance personnel since they are viewed as being Renaissance-like in their intimate understanding of all things brokerage and/or financial. Unfortunately, that perception may be more perceived than real.

This model is especially common at smaller firms, and senior compliance personnel are called upon often to act in dual capacities: compliance overseer, and, frequently, as the person designated to approve the opening of new accounts and to grant approval with respect to the sales of certain products, such as variable annuities. While we may all appreciate the expediency and necessity of the need to wear multiple hats in a smaller shop, these latter functions may be interpreted by FINRA as line supervisory duties, and cause the compliance officer to be viewed as a business supervisor for regulatory purposes. 

In a pure and ideal world, Compliance is not a line-function, compliance officers are objective and impartial in their assessments and recommendations, and their evaluations are not tied innately to revenue considerations. While the failure to factor in the impact of compliance decisions on the fate and fortunes of the company is a luxury most compliance officers (and their firms) can ill-afford, traditionally, compliance has been used as a tool to identify problems or issues which must be remedied by the business unit responsible for the revenue activity. In that model, compliance is called upon later to examine and report on the performance of these managers. 

However, when the compliance officer is cast in the role of both cop and “perpetrator,” the oversight chain loses its tensility. In essence, who is left to oversee the function when the compliance officer is carrying out dual roles: compliance officer and supervisor? The end repercussion is that the compliance officer creates potential failure to supervise liability for him/her self, and may be called to task by a regulator or arbitration panel for failing to perform either of his/her assigned duties to industry standards.  The logical and ultimate repercussion may be a charge of a failure to supervise or similar dereliction of duty allegation.

So, how does the compliance officer/supervisor build firewalls under these circumstances? In the first instance, the head of the particular business unit with the greatest stake in the transaction at issue should not be isolated from the decision making process . Rather, exceptions to firm policy may be forwarded to him/her for resolution, although if this person is consistently faulty or lax in granting approvals, this may ultimately not help the compliance officer avoid sanction for failed supervisory effort. 

Perhaps a better alternative is to establish a Compliance Committee consisting of compliance and senior business unit personnel to address “exceptions” and sensitive intra-firm compliance issues. Under this scenario, the Committee would meet at least monthly, but more frequently if necessary. To be effective, clearly defined standards must be established by the firm with regard to the appropriateness of certain activity. For instance, with regard to sales of variable annuities, no sales would be permitted to retirement accounts or to customers over a designated age or in amounts that would appear excessive based on the customers identified financial circumstances. Exceptions may not be unilaterally granted by the compliance officer who is asked to review and approve an annuity application. Rather, the request for an exception would be submitted to the Compliance Committee for review, consideration, and approval. Thus, the business unit leaders with, in theory, the highest level of expertise would sit in judgment of the request for an exception, and it becomes a group rather than individual decision of either the compliance officer or the one business person who stands to gain the most from the transaction if it is permitted to go forward regardless of its merits. Once established, the Compliance Committee may provide a number of additional valuable benefits to the company, enabling senior management to both learn of and address myriad problems at an early stage, and to take as necessary pro-active steps to interdict the problem before it spins out of control. 

The benefit to the compliance officer who is wearing multiple hats is obvious: he or she potentially limits personal regulatory exposure. But the firm benefits too, and if its actions are later cited as inadequate, the group decision making concept, unless the Committee is simply a rubber stamp, allows for the argument that business judgment, not disinterest or disregard of the rules, dictated the decision.  Firms are still permitted, in the exercise of their business judgment, to make mistakes or reach different decisions than a regulator who judges the events after the fact. If the Committee decisions are well vetted and reasonable under the circumstances, significant defenses may be available to address later second-guessing by a regulator or an aggrieved investor.

Jonathan M. Harris
Lindquist & Vennum P.L.L.P.
Minneapolis, Minn.
(612) 371-2492
jharris@lindquist.com

More Regulatory Focus on Annuity Sales to Seniors

Annuity sales practices continue to be a hot regulatory topic.  As Chris reported on this blog last week, the NASD has slapped Raymond James Financial with a $2.75 million fine for deficient supervision in the sales of annuities and mutual funds to seniors and other risk-adverse customers.  www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/NASDW_018681. Continue Reading...

Grasso Ordered to Pay Back Around $100 Million

A New York Supreme Court has ordered Richard Grasso to pay back around $100 million he received in compensation while serving as chairman of the New York Stock Exchange in 2003. The order, issued October 19, 2006, granted partial summary judgment to New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, who started this lawsuit against Grasso in 2004. The order found that Grasso breached his fiduciary duties owed to the NYSE's board of directors by not disclosing to the board that increases in his pay would result in his Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan ("SERP") skyrocketing. Grasso's 2003 pay package was $187.50 million. Presiding Judge Charles Ramos found Grasso's defense that he was ignorant about the true value of his SERP shocking. The case is People of the State of New York v. Grasso et al., case number 401620/04. Grasso has filed an appeal challenging the judge's ruling.

NASD Slaps Brokerage Firm for Failure to Supervise Crooked Broker Working at Home

The NASD has long warned brokerage firms about their ongoing duties to monitor independent contractors, even those working at remote locations. The NASD put some teeth behind those warnings when it announced in a recent release sanctions imposed against LaSalle Street Securities, Inc. for failing to supervise Frank Devine, a former representative of the firm, who recently began serving a 13 year prison term after pleading guilty to federal wire and tax fraud charges for defrauding investors in a Ponzi scheme.

The NASD found that in June 1998, when LaSalle Street hired Devine, he disclosed a pending NASD investigation into the termination from his prior employment for unauthorized outside business activities. In September 1998, the NASD notified Devine that it intended to pursue disciplinary action against him. Notwithstanding this background, and knowing that Devine maintained a separate business account and conducted several outside businesses, LaSalle permitted Devine to work from his home with no on-site supervision.

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