Wearing the Bull's-eye: The Compliance Officer as Line Supervisor

It is axiomatic that smaller firms do not have available the cadres of specialized compliance personnel that larger firms do. Out of necessity, senior compliance staff at smaller firms may be called upon to handle a multitude of home office functions in addition to compliance, and to serve in multiple capacities. Unfortunately, cost efficiency, not necessarily expertise is the driver of these decisions. This burden may fall especially hard on compliance personnel since they are viewed as being Renaissance-like in their intimate understanding of all things brokerage and/or financial. Unfortunately, that perception may be more perceived than real.

This model is especially common at smaller firms, and senior compliance personnel are called upon often to act in dual capacities: compliance overseer, and, frequently, as the person designated to approve the opening of new accounts and to grant approval with respect to the sales of certain products, such as variable annuities. While we may all appreciate the expediency and necessity of the need to wear multiple hats in a smaller shop, these latter functions may be interpreted by FINRA as line supervisory duties, and cause the compliance officer to be viewed as a business supervisor for regulatory purposes. 

In a pure and ideal world, Compliance is not a line-function, compliance officers are objective and impartial in their assessments and recommendations, and their evaluations are not tied innately to revenue considerations. While the failure to factor in the impact of compliance decisions on the fate and fortunes of the company is a luxury most compliance officers (and their firms) can ill-afford, traditionally, compliance has been used as a tool to identify problems or issues which must be remedied by the business unit responsible for the revenue activity. In that model, compliance is called upon later to examine and report on the performance of these managers. 

However, when the compliance officer is cast in the role of both cop and “perpetrator,” the oversight chain loses its tensility. In essence, who is left to oversee the function when the compliance officer is carrying out dual roles: compliance officer and supervisor? The end repercussion is that the compliance officer creates potential failure to supervise liability for him/her self, and may be called to task by a regulator or arbitration panel for failing to perform either of his/her assigned duties to industry standards.  The logical and ultimate repercussion may be a charge of a failure to supervise or similar dereliction of duty allegation.

So, how does the compliance officer/supervisor build firewalls under these circumstances? In the first instance, the head of the particular business unit with the greatest stake in the transaction at issue should not be isolated from the decision making process . Rather, exceptions to firm policy may be forwarded to him/her for resolution, although if this person is consistently faulty or lax in granting approvals, this may ultimately not help the compliance officer avoid sanction for failed supervisory effort. 

Perhaps a better alternative is to establish a Compliance Committee consisting of compliance and senior business unit personnel to address “exceptions” and sensitive intra-firm compliance issues. Under this scenario, the Committee would meet at least monthly, but more frequently if necessary. To be effective, clearly defined standards must be established by the firm with regard to the appropriateness of certain activity. For instance, with regard to sales of variable annuities, no sales would be permitted to retirement accounts or to customers over a designated age or in amounts that would appear excessive based on the customers identified financial circumstances. Exceptions may not be unilaterally granted by the compliance officer who is asked to review and approve an annuity application. Rather, the request for an exception would be submitted to the Compliance Committee for review, consideration, and approval. Thus, the business unit leaders with, in theory, the highest level of expertise would sit in judgment of the request for an exception, and it becomes a group rather than individual decision of either the compliance officer or the one business person who stands to gain the most from the transaction if it is permitted to go forward regardless of its merits. Once established, the Compliance Committee may provide a number of additional valuable benefits to the company, enabling senior management to both learn of and address myriad problems at an early stage, and to take as necessary pro-active steps to interdict the problem before it spins out of control. 

The benefit to the compliance officer who is wearing multiple hats is obvious: he or she potentially limits personal regulatory exposure. But the firm benefits too, and if its actions are later cited as inadequate, the group decision making concept, unless the Committee is simply a rubber stamp, allows for the argument that business judgment, not disinterest or disregard of the rules, dictated the decision.  Firms are still permitted, in the exercise of their business judgment, to make mistakes or reach different decisions than a regulator who judges the events after the fact. If the Committee decisions are well vetted and reasonable under the circumstances, significant defenses may be available to address later second-guessing by a regulator or an aggrieved investor.

Jonathan M. Harris
Lindquist & Vennum P.L.L.P.
Minneapolis, Minn.
(612) 371-2492
jharris@lindquist.com

Auction Rate Securities Sales In Regulators' Cross-Hairs

The recent slew of lawsuits brought against some of the nation's largest broker-dealers that sold Auction Rate Securities ("ARS") to customers has not gone unnoticed. The SEC and FINRA, on the heels of the lawsuit filings, have each launched independent investigations of their own into the sales and marketing practices employed by firms selling ARS. And commentary submitted in recent days suggests emphasis of the investigations will, at least in part, lead to focus on the suitability of the sales.

In a March 31, 2008 investor alert, FINRA discussed the impact the collapse of the ARS market has had on investors. Significantly, a large portion of its discussion concerned the liquidity of the securities and how "due to recent developments in the credit market—including downgrades in the credit ratings of bond issuers and bond insurers—a significant number of auctions have failed, leaving some investors who counted on immediate access to their funds wondering about their options." FINRA also recently sent a survey to brokerage firms specifically inquiring about who the firm sold ARS to (i.e. retail individual, high net worth individual, non-professional institutional, or professional institutional customer) and whether the firm was willing to offer margin loans to customers using ARS as collateral. And in Regulatory Notice 08-17, effective April 1, 2008, FINRA added "three new product categories for use by member firms in reporting customer complaints relating to auction rate securities."

Taken together, these actions leave little doubt that firm ARS sales and supervision may come under the lens of regulatory inquiry for the foreseeable future and likely remain one of the main topics of inquiry for 2008, given the fact hundreds of billions of dollars of ARS were sold.

SEC reveals "Top 10 Compliance Issues for 2008" at SIFMA Conference

Commissioner Lori Richards revealed the SEC’s “Top 10 Compliance Issues for 2008” during the general session at the 40th annual SIFMA national conference yesterday in Orlando, Florida.  According to Ms. Richards, the top 10 areas of scrutiny in SEC board exams in 2008 will be:

  1. Valuations.
  2. Firm controls over non-public information.  In particular, the SEC is interested in whether the firm has identified the type and sources of non-public information to which it is privy, and whether the firm has implemented and properly tested procedures for protecting that information.
  3. Retail sales practices – with an emphasis on protecting seniors.
  4. Supervision. 
  5. Net capital/internal controls (which will receive increased focus given recent developments).  Ms. Richards noted that 20% of the exams last year uncovered errors in net capital calculation.
  6. Trading.
  7. Fixed Income.
  8. Rating agencies.
  9. Conflicts of interest.  The “hot list” for this area includes payments by advisors to broker dealers to appear on “recommended advisor lists,” and broker-dealers who sell interests in affiliated hedge funds.
  10. Anti-money laundering.
  11. Information/account security (refusing to be limited to just 10 areas, Ms. Richard actually named 11 key areas of scrutiny for 2008).  The SEC is particularly interested in whether broker-dealers have adequate control over their customers’ assets and information, and what controls broker-dealers adopt when they outsource regulating activities.  According to Ms. Richards, the SEC will focus on midsized firms this year. 

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SIFMA General Session -- Day One

Today is the opening day of the annual SIFMA conference, held this year in Orlando. This morning's general session, moderated by Gary Lynch, executive vice president and chief legal officer of Morgan Stanley, included panelists James Brigagliano of the SEC; Richard Ketchum of NYSE Regulation, Inc.; John Moloney of Moloney Securities Company Inc.; and Mary Schapiro, Chief Executive Officer of FINRA. SIFMA's kick-off topic was "NYSE and NASD Merger -- How is it Working?"

Mary Schapiro (FINRA) commented that the merger has gone well and has met her expectations at this stage, noting:

  • The governance board is in place;
  • The business processes used by NYSE and NASD are largely consolidated;
  • A mid-2009 date is anticipated for the completion of combining the technologies from NYSE and NASD, having already retired 14 systems; and
  • The completion of a consolidated rule book will take time, and is made more complex by a rapidly changing environment, both on the regulatory side and in the market place. It is likely that there will be rules coming out for comment by Spring.

Although it has not yet been a year since the merger, Richard Ketchum (NYSE Regulation) believes that the industry has already benefitted by a more efficient and effective single examination program, and through the interpretation of the rules through one body. He also noted that the ability to create a consolidated set of rules constitutes a one-in-a-lifetime opportunity to step back and look at the rules fresh.

John Moloney (Moloney Securities) noted that from a small firm perspective, there are varied opinions on the effectiveness of the merger, but many small firms do view the examinations to be more poignant and drill-down as to what is important.

The Panel also discussed whether principle-based regulation or rule-based regulation should control. Mary Schapiro commented that while principles are very valuable, she did not view them as replacing the rule book. Mr. Ketchum agreed, noting that principles can bring a level of confidence, guidance, and framework for the rules themselves.

Gary Lynch (Morgan Stanley) questioned whether a two-tier system of regulation makes sense for institutional and retail markets. In terms of any "carve-out" from the rules for institutional clients, James Brigagliano (SEC) agreed with Mary Schapiro that a broad institutional carve-out would be extremely hard, that there is a need to look at regulation on a rule-by-rule basis, and that the most challenging aspect to any carve-out is determining sophistication (i.e., just because the investor is large with a lot of assets to invest doesn't necessarily mean it is sophisticated).

In terms of enforcement, Mr. Ketchum and Ms. Schapiro noted that taking a more risk-based focus on examinations makes sense, so that regulator's resources are focused on those firms with the highest risk to the public. With that, the hundreds of conference participants packed in the auditorium-style room disbursed to the various break-out sessions.

Stay tuned for an update about tomorrow's general session which focuses on current SEC issues.

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SEC proposes new rule aimed at naked short selling

The SEC voted unanimously yesterday to propose a new rule intended to enhance the SEC's ability to crack down on naked short sales and failures to deliver shares that are used in such sales, Reuters reported

Short selling involves sales of borrowed shares, in the hope of repurchasing them later at a lower price. Naked short selling involves sales without first borrowing the shares or making an "affirmative determination" that the shares can be borrowed.

The SEC adopted Regulation SHO four years ago in an effort to curtail short-selling abuses. However, the SEC’s enforcement powers under Regulation SHO are limited. Stating the obvious, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox explained, “Reg SHO can’t be effective without enforcement.” According to Mr. Cox, the SEC's new proposed rule is designed to give Regulation SHO “teeth.” Under the new proposal, the SEC would create an antifraud rule specifically targeting targets sellers who intentionally deceive broker-dealers or purchasers about their ability to meet delivery deadlines. 

The SEC is seeking public comment on its proposal.

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PLAINTIFF'S BAR'S GO-TO DAMAGES EXPERT WITNESS JAILED FOR PERJURY

John B. Torkelsen, an expert witness heavily utilized by the Plaintiffs' securities bar over the past several years to "testify on such issues as damages allegedly suffered by plaintiffs' classes and the appropriate value of settlements reached in several class action cases around the country," entered into a plea agreement before the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Federal Court, in which he plead guilty to perjury, admitting that "he lied to numerous federal judges across the county who were presiding over securities class actions."

Boiled down, Torkelsen had told various courts that he was an independent expert, yet certain law firms that hired him did so on a contingent fee basis and then concealed the payment arrangement from the courts. According to a Department of Justice litigation release, in furtherance of the scheme, the firms would then "submit to courts requests for reimbursement of fees already paid to Torkelsen when, in fact, the fees had not been paid and would not be paid unless the court awarded fees to the law firms; cause Torkelsen to submit declarations in which he falsely stated under oath that he had been retained on a non-contingent basis when, in fact, he had been retained on a contingent basis; cause Torkelsen to write-off fees he had incurred in class actions in which the law firms did not obtain a successful result; and cause Torkelsen to submit inflated fee requests in other class actions, billing for work that Torkelsen did not actually perform, in order to allow Torkelsen to make up for fees he did not recover in unsuccessful class actions."

Dishonesty has no place in the courtroom. At the end of the day, plaintiffs and defendants alike, as well as their counsel, are well-served by removal of such elements.

A detailed discussion of this case can be found on the Department of Justice's website at www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pressroom/pr2008/020.html

Legislators Call For Controversial Reforms Following Lerach Sentencing

Legislators on Capital Hill reintroduced the "Securities Litigation Attorney Accountability and Transparency Act" last week. The Act, which was initially introduced in 2006, would permit courts to award successful defendants their attorneys’ fees in federal securities class actions when it is determined that the plaintiffs’ position was not “substantially justified,” require the disclosure of conflicts of interest between plaintiffs and their counsel, and allow courts to appoint lead counsel through a competitive bidding system.

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More Commentary on Industry Arbitration

There’s a timely article up at Bloomberg regarding the ongoing back and forth between the securities industry and claimants’ bar regard the fairness of mandatory industry arbitration. The article cites the recent survey on claimant perceptions of arbitration fairness commissioned by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA"), and conducted by the Investor Rights Clinic at Pace University Law School.

The SICA survey, together with a to-be-expected rebuttal piece from SIFMA, point out the sharp differences in perception regarding whether the current arbitration system is fundamentally biased toward firms. The SICA survey pointed to, for example, the declining numbers of hearings ending in awards, as well as the increasing number of early settlements. Does this show that the system is increasingly stacked against investors? Does it indicate, rather, that firms identify meritorious cases and settle, rather than defend through a hearing? Can any generalizations be drawn about the large number of industry and public arbitrators, other than that every lawyer and firm in this area – whether on the claimant or defense side – has had both fair results and real head-scratchers.

One thing is clear: both investors’ groups and state regulators will continue to push FINRA to make its arbitration forum more investor-friendly – or to eliminate mandatory arbitration entirely.

Supreme Court Rules on ERISA and 401(k) Liability

Yesterday, the U.S Supreme Court handed down an important decision regarding the liability of ERISA plans, and in particular, employer-sponsored 401(k) plans, to individual plan participants.

In LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg and Associates, Inc., the plaintiff had sued his employer-sponsored 401(k) for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 502(a)(2) after, he alleged, the plan failed to implement his investment directions, resulting in a loss of about $150,000 to his account. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal on the pleadings, holding that ERISA provides such remedies only for entire plans, and not for individual participants.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that its reasoning in Massachussetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) which limited recoveries under § 502(a)(2) to “the plan as a whole” nonetheless did not bar an fiduciary breach claim by the plaintiff in the present case. Interestingly, the majority opinion by Justice Stevens pointed to particular features of defined contribution plans such as 401(k) plans, as opposed to the defined benefit plan at issue in Russell. Justice Steven’s opinion noted that “Russell’s emphasis on protecting the “entire plan” from fiduciary misconduct reflects the former landscape of employee benefit plans. That landscape has changed.” The unanimous court ruled that the plaintiff could proceed with his ¶ 502(a)(2) fiduciary breach claim. (Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in the judgment, noting that he questioned whether the claim was properly brought under § 502(a)(2), rather than the non-fiduciary provisions of § 502(a)(1)(B). Justices Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a separate concurrence, noting, characteristically, a reliance on the “plain text” of 502(a)(2), and that the decision should not be “contingent on trends in the pension plan market” nor “the ostensible “concerns” of ERISA’s drafters.”

So what does this mean? The short of it is that ERISA plan fiduciaries are now, unequivocally, subject to claims by individual participants based on alleged fiduciary breaches in handling an individual participant’s account. This is a walk-down from what had been understood to be a fair degree of protection under ERISA, at least for ERISA-based fiduciary claims, from lawsuit based on losses in individual participant accounts, as opposed to claims for damages by plan fiduciaries to the “plan as a whole.”

FINRA Fines Oppenheimer $4.5 Million for Market Timing

The latest on the market-timing settlement front: Oppenheimer agrees to pay FINRA $4.5 million for mutual-fund market timing conducted by five of its traders on behalf of hedge fund clients. 

Once again, a firm is stung by an apparent “head in the sand” compliance and supervisory approach to a small group of its reps acting on behalf of a small number of high-value clients. This in the face of what FINRA describes as “about 200 communications from 65 mutual fund companies” regarding the short-term trading those companies were noting.

Lessons: (1) establish and enforce consistent compliance systems; (2) don’t make exceptions for “high value” clients or reps; (3) don’t ignore apparent red flags.