"Tweeting" Running "Afowl" of SEC Rules?

With the rise of internet blogging and now Twitter, more and more individuals are finding an audience for their message, whatever that message may be. Even corporations have jumped on the bandwagon, with brick and mortar giants like Wal-Mart and General Motors joining the ranks of internet-based companies who have set up their own corporate blogs. But while open channels of communication between corporations and the public are arguably beneficial to the general public and perhaps investors, can there be too much of a good thing? Maybe. And that may spell trouble for corporations.

Since Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, the US Government has sought to provide certain safeguards for investors in publicly traded securities through creation of a mandatory system of periodic disclosure. Boiled down, public companies like GM or Wal-Mart must disclose on a routine basis certain information like their financial status and other material developments that a reasonable investor should know - filings like annual statements which are monitored and reviewed by the Securities and Exchange Commission - the governmental entity tasked with enforcing compliance with US Securities Laws.

Thus, when companies engage in blogging or tweeting with the public, they necessarily expose themselves to a potential liability with the SEC knocking on their door if it determines they failed to make adequate disclosures or otherwise did not put in necessary safeguards to caution the public about the statements and viewpoints being expressed thereby misleading investors. And as well all know, the SEC carries a big stick.

As social networking mediums continue to expand and reach unprecedented levels of use in the months and years ahead, it will be interesting to see how the SEC responds, particularly with respect to enforcement issues concerning adequate disclosure. Indeed, it is not inconceivable to expect SEC rules defining "solicitation" and "offering" to be revisited and perhaps modified to take into account the nature and adequacy of communications in these new mediums. Accordingly, for now, public companies are probably best served by erring on the side of caution and proceeding slowing when exploring new channels of communications.

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So, Who is Taking Care of Business? The Compliance Officer in Times of Economic Distress

It is not a startling revelation to observe that a principal side-effect of the current tribulations affecting the financial services industry is a marked shrinkage in revenues. Inevitably, there is a domino effect to the diminution in revenues and profits, and the financial services community, which potentially encompasses a wide array of businesses, including securities brokerage, investment advisory services, insurance, and banking, are under pressure to dramatically cut costs and reduce expenses, which often is interpreted to mean reduce headcount. This article will focus on one of the dangers faced by the brokerage/advisory industry if the reduction of costs includes the downsizing of compliance departments.

In the past, management often used numbers creatively, and reductions in staff levels at many entities historically have come in the form of the elimination of open but unfilled spots on the roster. By not filling the open spot, it may be argued that the group or department is down in head count, hereby meeting the corporate mandate to reduce or eliminate costs. Today, the cuts are deeper and closer to the bone, and they are across the organization. No segment of the business is immune or inured, including compliance staff. 

To appreciate its value to the entity, one must first define the role played by the compliance department. When it is functioning at its best, compliance is a pro-active body, anticipating areas of potential concern when a new product or business line is introduced, or formulating measures that are both practical and effective when regulatory rules change. The compliance arm is often vested with responsibility for identifying issues before they become problems or fester too long, working toward practical and therapeutic solutions and not just treating the side effects. This ability often comes from an innate knowledge of the firm, how it does business, and the standards posed by the regulatory agencies and the world at large on the conduct of firms operating in a highly regulated environment. The seasoned compliance officer develops a sixth sense for problems, recognizing the unusual from the pedestrian, creating his/her own “watch list” of potential sources of problems (e.g. know your broker), and generally being the eyes and ears, and maybe even the conscience, of the organization. 

Unlike the role often assumed by a firm’s legal department, which is frequently reactive and saddled with addressing actual or perceived sales practice violations or probing and demanding regulatory inquiries, compliance is vested with the responsibility to “prevent, avoid, and detect,” and to address in timely fashion procedural weaknesses or ethical shortcomings.

Wall Street today is a broken and battered remnant of a once proud pillar of U.S. economic strength.  While it’s convenient to blame greedy bankers and brokers for this unfortunate turn of events, its difficult to argue that compliance performed exceptionally well or with remarkable effectiveness in the recent past either. History has taught that even when fully staffed, the compliance task is difficult and success often ephemeral. Unfortunately, the short term cost benefits associated with a reduction of compliance personnel may prove illusory, increasing the likelihood that the company will pay later, perhaps at a significantly higher price, for problems that may have been avoided or detected earlier. Unless the organization is prepared to treat these later, magnified problems as simply a deferred cost of doing business, termination decisions should not be made capriciously or without careful and deliberate consideration of the repercussions and ramifications.

This is not to propose that compliance personnel not share in the vicissitudes of the organization, especially if they hope and expect to share in the firm’s fortunes. However, deep and non-surgical efforts to trim compliance staff may not bode well for the future of the firm, and should be exercised prudently and shrewdly. While computerized systems are invaluable tools and allow for extraordinarily creative techniques to aid in the management of the business, they may not universally fulfill the role of a seasoned compliance officer who is armed with the ability to see behind the superficial or the “logical.” Computer systems are beneficial as a tool, but they cannot provide a substitute for experience, perspective, or those intuitive vital skills developed by the compliance officer over years of trial, error, and observation.  

If the ax must fall, a significant component of the firm’s planning must address how the compliance function is to be carried out with minimal disruption to the oversight capabilities of its compliance staff.  Perhaps a new model must be developed for effective compliance. Perhaps technology can fill some of the gaps. Perhaps it is incumbent on management of the compliance function to cross-train the staff so that the disruptions caused by reduced headcount are minimalized. Perhaps people with fresh ideas must be identified, deputized, and given the opportunity introduce untraditional and innovative approaches. But the answer is probably not to impose on another existing and functional arm of the firm duties beyond the capabilities or experience of its personnel. The effort to impose compliance responsibility on personnel with lesser pure compliance expertise, such as staff assigned to the financial or operations sides of the business, may be superficially appealing since they are all “back-office,” non-revenue producing divisions, and work in the arcane world of rules and regulations.  But such an approach may be a recipe for failure, as over-burdened, under-trained staff in accord with the Peter Principle and similar truisms prove incapable of ultimately performing either job to appropriate standards. 

Even if regulatory mandate did not impose on firms the obligation to establish and maintain an effective compliance presence, sound business practices would dictate it. The mantra “good compliance is good for business” still rings true today, and those firms which will not only survive the present economic malaise but will flourish when times are better will be those that strike the appropriate balance between business objectives and oversight necessity.

Broker-Dealer Litigation/Arbitration: Preparing for a Tsunami?

In an apparent effort to address perceived procedural deficiencies, to level the playing field so that customers are not disadvantaged in arbitration, and perhaps in anticipation and preparation for a virtual deluge of new filings, FINRA has revised and/or introduced a number of arbitration-related processes. Included in this revamping are the introduction of special arbitration procedures for use in customer claims for Auction Rate Securities-related investment losses; the imposition of sanctions, and limitations on the filing of Motions to Dismiss before the conclusion of the case-in-chief; and increased thresholds for single arbitrator cases to $100,000. While some question whether these revisions will ultimately serve the best interests of either the aggrieved customer or the accused broker, or effectively streamline the dispute resolution mechanism, time will tell.

Arguably, the special arbitration procedures for ARS-related consequential damages is the most striking of the recent additions to the FINRA arsenal. In connection with ARS cases alone, customers are given the option to elect to employ the special procedures or more traditional procedures, and if the former, are given virtually a free opportunity (sans legal fees) to recoup consequential damages from brokerage firms that are parties to ARS-related settlements with the government, imposing on firms the obligation to assume many of the arbitration costs, including filing and hearing session fees, and all expenses for the arbitrators. By employing these procedures, the customer precludes the ability of the brokerage firm to contest liability with regard to the illiquidity of ARS transactions. The customer bears the burden of proving he/she suffered damages due to an inability to liquidate an ARS position. In such instances, the customer may pursue consequential damages only, which FINRA defines as opportunity costs or losses resulting from the investor’s inability to access his/her funds due to the freeze imposed on assets when the ARS market dissolved. Investors seeking punitive or other damages will still have to avail themselves of standard FINRA arbitration procedures. One anticipates that the “lost opportunity” determinant will be hotly contested, as Claimants’ counsel attempt to subsume under this standard a wide array of loses, real and imagined.

The most potentially troublesome of the revisions are new Rules 12504 and 13504, which limit pre-hearing motions to dismiss and impose sanctions when the motion is brought unsuccessfully. Perceived principally as a customer protection provision, the new rule is intended to reduce the number of frivolous and non-meritorious motions brought prior to the presentation of the case-in-chief, and to ensure that customers are provided with an opportunity to be heard by a panel. Designed in an effort to help the customer avoid unnecessary expense, impede efforts to disadvantage unsophisticated claimants, and to expedite hearings on the merits, the movant must first file an Answer. Subsequently, the motion may be brought on one of three grounds:

1) the non-moving party previously released the claims in dispute by a signed settlement agreement and/or written release. Parties seeking this exception should provide arbitrators with valid documents that indicate that the claims in the current dispute have been resolved in a previous dispute. Rules 12504(a)(6)(A) and 13504(a)(6)(A).

2) the moving party was not associated with the accounts, securities or conduct at issue. In essence, there has been a mistake, and the claim has been brought against the wrong person or entity, or a claim names an individual who was not employed by the firm during the time of the dispute or an individual or entity that was not connected to an account, security or conduct during the time of the dispute. Rules 12504(a)(6)(B) and 13504(a)(6)(b).

3) the claim is not eligible for submission to arbitration because six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim. Parties seeking this exception should provide arbitrators with valid documents that indicate when the occurrence or event took place. Rules 12206(b)(7) and 13206(b)(7).
Should the panel deny the motion, all motion-related costs must be imposed on the moving party; if the panel views the motion as frivolous, it may also impose costs and attorney fees on the movant and/or impose other sanctions. All of the arbitrators must agree to the dismissal, and explain their decision in writing.

The most glaring infirmity in the motion to dismiss process is the need to file an answer before the submission of the motion. While the new motion requirements may limit the ability of a Respondent to delay inordinately a Claimant’s right to be heard by a panel, by requiring that the answer be submitted before filing a motion the rules impose extraordinary additional costs on a Respondent in cases in which there was either no merit to the claim or it was ineligible for arbitration in the first instance. That facet of the rules seems unfair to the prevailing Respondent, since a party should not have to assume the costs and expenses of submitting a defense when there was no basis for the assertion of the underlying claims. There is no express provision within the rule imposing Respondents’ costs on the Claimant if the motion is brought successfully. One will have to look to other provisions of the Code in order to obtain such a remedy.

The other significant revision of the Code is the raised threshold for the designation of panels. After March 30, 2009, cases seeking $100,000 or less, exclusive of costs and expenses, will be assigned a one person panel. The panel member must be chair qualified and chosen from the roster of public arbitrators. Upon the joint application of the parties, a three person panel may be designated. In theory this procedure should provide a quicker and more efficient resolution of claims falling within this range of damages. Notably, if the dollar amount of the claim is unspecified, or does not request monetary damages, a three arbitrator panel will designated unless the parties agree in writing to have the case heard before a single arbitrator. The rule does not provide a mechanism for the staff of FINRA to make a determination that an unspecified demand should be assigned to the single person panel. Rules 12401 and 13401.

Will these revisions to the Code of Arbitration Procedure provide an elixir that will advance the interests of FINRA’s dual constituency: the investing public and the financial services industry? Will these new rules minimize or avoid log jams if a plethora of new customer cases or intra-broker disputes surface? While in certain instances they may reduce costs to the combatants and expedite the process (e.g. $100,000 threshold rule), the motion practice provisions are unsettling from the defense perspective, necessitating significant and costly procedural steps before having a meritorious and dispositive issue heard. This does not “level the playing field” or otherwise equally advance the interests of Respondents, but in this market environment no one is going to raise the flag in defense of the industry if to do so may be viewed as customer-phobic. Remarkably, no politician has ever been elected by trumpeting the cause of the industry over the public, and FINRA is not about to buck that trend now.
 

NEW FINRA RULE REQUIRES EXPLAINED DECISION

On February 4, 2009, the SEC approved FINRA’s proposed rule change to amend arbitrator rules relating to arbitration decisions. The new rule requires arbitrators to provide a written explanation of their decisions upon a joint request of the parties.

Key provisions of the new rule include:

  • Parties must jointly request an explained decision;
  • Parties must submit their request for an explained decision 20 days before the first scheduled hearing date;
  • The Chairperson must write the explained decision;
  • The explained decision will be "fact-based," stating the general reasons for the decision;
  • The Chairperson will receive $400 honorarium for writing the decision; and
  • The honorarium cost will be allocated between the parties.

 The new rule does not allow parties to request an explained decision when (1) the arbitration proceedings are simple and decided solely upon the pleadings and evidence filed by the parties, or (2) the arbitration is conducted under a default proceeding.   While the new rule still gives arbitrators discretion to decide whether to write an explained decision at their own initiative or upon the request of one party, they are not required to draft an explained decision unless both parties agree.

 

A primary purpose behind the new rule is to address investors’ concerns that they are unable to understand the rationale behind arbitration awards absent explanation. Since application of the rule requires both investor and industry party consent, only time will tell if the new rule will have any impact.*

 

*Special thanks to Shirley Munson for her assistance with preparing this article.

 

Treasury Blueprint for Regulatory Reform Likely to Get Longer Look

This March, the Treasury Department released its Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.  The Blueprint called for a thorough restructuring – and even deeper federalization – of the financial services regulatory system.  The Blueprint called for, among other things: a new federal agency to oversee mortgage origination; optional federal chartering for insurance companies; consolidating federal banking oversight with one agency, regardless of whether a bank is federally or state chartered; merging the SEC and the CFTC; and creating a triple-headed scheme of federal regulation, with single agencies having oversight for market stability, “prudential” oversight of government-backed institutions, and business conduct.

 

At the time the Blueprint was released, the financial services and securities industry was headed for rough water:  the auction-rate securities market had cratered; subprime mortgage portfolios and mortgage backed securities were clearly in trouble; concerns were bubbling about naked short selling; Bear Stearns collapsed, and was sold.

 

Those were the days.  Since then, Lehman Brothers imploded.  Merrill Lynch was sold at a firesale.  AIG required emergency resuscitation to survive. Subprime lending and overinvestment (and misvaluation) of subprime-backed securities has proven to be the biggest disaster, and even more damaging, since the junk bond/leveraged buyout mania that fueled and then destroyed Drexel Burnham Lambert in the 1980s.  And Congress is on the verge of passing a staggering bailout package to try to bring some sort of order to the market. 

 

In this environment, the push for a regulatory overhaul will only be more intense.  With a new administration on the horizon, the demand for substantial increases in the scope of federal regulation will make change inevitable, regardless of whether it is an Obama or McCain administration.  The Treasury Blueprint  will, undoubtedly, not be the exact model for a new regulatory scheme. However, we can be sure that federal oversight will become both broader and deeper.

Reserve Fund Accused of Securities Fraud in Giant Money Market Fund.

Recent events show the breadth of the financial crisis rocking this country, with concerns of fraud impacting nearly every financial sector.  News reports today indicate that the FBI is investigating possible mortgage fraud involving collapsed financial giants Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers and AIG.  The FBI says it is currently investigating 26 firms as part of its corporate fraud investigation involving sub prime lenders, with 1,400 mortgage-fraud cases being pursued nation-wide. 

Even money market funds are finding themselves embroiled in claims of securities fraud abuses.  Yesterday Minnesota federal judge Paul A. Magnuson extended a temporary restraining order issued last Friday against mutual fund manager Reserve Fund, restraining it from honoring redemption requests from its giant money market fund, the Primary Fund.  The Order stems from a lawsuit filed last week by Ameriprise Financial against Reserve Fund,alleging that it violated federal securities laws and breached fiduciary duties owed to investors by "tipping" certain large institutional investors last Monday that The Primary Fund was exposed to significant debt issued by Lehman Brothers. That was the same day Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. 

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The Federal Judiciary Skeptical of Regulators?

In today's battered economy, where venerable giants like Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch now face bankruptcy or sale, a more subtle but equally intriguing phenomenon has taken hold. Beginning a few years ago and continuing today, more and more federal courts across the country have been standing up to the regulators, most notably evidenced by the rising number of dismissals of enforcement actions brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, notwithstanding the looming specter of Enron, options backdating scandals, hedge fund shenanigans, and even more recently the auction rate securities fall-out.

The question is ... why?

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Short Sellers Leave Banks Feeling Anxious Following Unprecedented Weekend On Wall Street

According to the New York Times, the heads of several major financial institutions held an emergency meeting over the weekend to urge the SEC to reinstate a temporary rule limiting short selling, the risky but often lucrative practice of betting on a firm’s falling share price.  In July, the SEC briefly halted naked short selling after speculators placed large bets that shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the troubled mortgage giants, would decline

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SEC Issues New "ComplianceAlert"

Last week, the SEC released its second “ComplianceAlert,” discussing recent exam priorities and summarizing some of the Commission’s key findings and observations. Last year, the Commission put out a similar Alert for the first time, and – observing that the first Alert was well-received – appears poised to make this a regular communication.

The 2008 Alert describes findings for both investment advisors (with a heavy focus on institutional asset managers and mutual funds, rather than retail advisors) and broker-dealers, with a brief nod to transfer agents. The Commission’s observations contain both bad (lunch seminars and mortgage-financed securities purchases) and good (soft dollar compliance). The specific findings are not terribly surprising, but the Alert paints a good picture of the SEC’s recent areas of concern and its current views on those topics.

For investment advisors/mutual funds, the Alert describes: (1) personal trading compliance; (2) proxy voting/use of proxy voting services; (3) valuation and liquidity for high yield municipal bond funds; and (4) soft dollar practices. For broker-dealers, the Alert addresses: (1) “free lunch” sales seminars; (2) valuation and collateral management related to subprime mortgage products; (3) sales issues related to B-Ds affiliated with insurance companies; (4) solicitation by B-Ds of advisory services; (5) mortgage financing of securities puchases; and (6) OSJ supervisory structure and procedures.

The entire seventeen-page report is worth a read, but here are a couple of brief documents that summarize in bullet form some of the Alert’s key observations, for both investment advisors/mutual funds and for broker-dealers.

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State Securities Administrators to Host Public Forum on Arbitration

The North American Securities Administrators Association will be holding a public forum on securities industry arbitration, on June 24 in New York City. 

NASAA, which is the organization of heads of securities departments from each of the American states and territories, as well as the Canadian provinces and Mexico, has long perceived industry securities arbitration as unfair to investors.  The organization has advocated for substantial changes in the arbitration system, including abolition of mandatory arbitration.

NASAA's position on securities arbitration is abundantly clear in the title of the upcoming forum:  Arbitration is Broken:  How Can it be Fixed?  According to NASAA, the forum "will feature a panel of legal and regulatory experts, academics, and consumer advocates who will address the manner in which arbitrations are conducted; whether the selection, qualification, and composition of arbitration panels is fair; and whether the arbitration process should be an option, not a requirement, for investors. Panelists also will discuss the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 and current research exploring consumer views on securities arbitration."

Registration for the forum is free, on a first-come-first served basis.  Registration details are on NASAA's website.